Bill C-29 · 45th Parliament · Mark Carney
Financial Crimes Agency Act
An Act to establish the Financial Crimes Agency and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts and regulations
Government bill. Still before Parliament.
- IntroducedApril 27, 2026
- Debated in principleJune 18, 2026
- Studied by a committeeNot reached
- Passed its first chamberNot reached
- Passed the second chamberNot reached
- Became lawNot reached
Leading supporters
Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.
- Mark CarneyPrime Minister
Who carries this bill
Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.
What it set out to do
On 27 April 2026, the Minister of Finance and National Revenue introduced Bill C-29, An Act to establish the Financial Crimes Agency and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts and regulations (Financial Crimes Agency Act) in the House of Commons and it was given first reading. Bill C-29 establishes the Financial Crimes Agency as a specialized federal law enforcement agency whose mandate is to investigate financial crimes and to contribute to the recovery of proceeds of crime. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts and regulations.
Summary by the Library of Parliament.
Where members stand
Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.
How it changed on the way
Only laws are compared, introduced against passed.
How precisely it is written
vagueChallenging the law: HardDisputing a charge: Moderate
The bill uses broad undefined phrases and subjective tests that leave wide room for argument over what counts as a financial crime or when the Commissioner must act. Precise numerical limits on terms and formal procedures for fiats sit alongside these open-ended grants of power.
Open to argument
“any conduct that adversely affects, or has the potential to adversely affect, the security or integrity of Canada’s economy or financial system or of any financial market in Canada”
Relies on subjective and predictive standards without objective thresholds or defined terms.“If the Commissioner considers it appropriate to do so, the Commissioner must, before commencing any investigation on their own initiative, consult”
Condition turns on the Commissioner’s personal assessment rather than fixed criteria.“on any matter that, in the Minister’s opinion, materially affects public policy or the strategic direction of the Agency”
Scope of ministerial direction is measured by the Minister’s own view, not an objective test.
Clear-cut
“The Commissioner is to hold office on a full-time basis during pleasure for a term of up to five years.”
Uses a clear numerical maximum and fixed term structure.“the Commissioner is to serve no more than 10 years in office in total.”
Provides an absolute cumulative limit that can be verified without discretion.
Discretion. Extensive discretion remains with the Commissioner to set investigation criteria, decide when to consult, delegate powers, and manage staffing, and with the Minister to issue directions and approve arrangements.
Challenging the law itself. The Act creates an agency and investigative powers rather than directly restricting individual conduct, making successful vagueness or overbreadth claims under section 7 of the Charter difficult on the face of the statute alone.
Disputing a charge under it. A person could argue that alleged conduct falls outside the open-ended definition of financial crime or that the Commissioner failed to follow the subjective consultation or criteria steps, but success would require litigating the same vague standards.
Read by a language model from the as introduced text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.
Did it work?
Only laws in force for two years or more are checked.
Who lobbied on it
No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.
Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.