Bill C-59 · 42th Parliament · Justin Trudeau
National Security Act, 2017
An Act respecting national security matters
Government bill. Became law.
- IntroducedJune 20, 2017
- Debated in principleJune 11, 2018
- Studied by a committeeDone
- Passed its first chamberJune 19, 2018
- Passed the second chamberMay 30, 2019
- Became lawJune 20, 2019
Leading supporters
Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.
- Justin TrudeauPrime Minister
Who carries this bill
Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.
What it set out to do
The pre-release version of this Legislative Summary is now available. Parliamentarians and their staff can obtain a copy by submitting a request or contacting the Library of Parliament. Members of the public can obtain a copy by contacting the Information Service at the Library of Parliament at [email protected]. On 20 June 2017, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness introduced Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, in the House of Commons and it was given first reading. Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts. Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain …
Summary by the Library of Parliament.
Where members stand
Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.
How it changed on the way
26% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (41,877 words introduced, 44,731 passed). A committee amended it.
substantial changeintent mostly kept
The bill added an entirely new Part 1.1 creating the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act and shifted the mandatory comprehensive review from the sixth year to the fourth year after section 168 comes into force. Several oversight provisions were expanded, including new review of ministerial directions and coordination with the Privacy Commissioner, while minor wording fixes and privilege language were also inserted.
- New Part 1.1 was inserted to enact the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act.
After: “Part 1.1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.”
- The timing of the comprehensive review was shortened from the sixth year to the fourth year.
Before: “Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the sixth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force.”
After: “Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force.”
- New authority was added for the Review Agency to review implementation of ministerial directions on national security or intelligence.
After: “Review — ministerial direction (2.1) The Review Agency must review the implementation of significant aspects of every new or modified ministerial direction that is issued to any of the following: (a) the Canadian Security Intelligence Service; (b) the Communications Security Establishment; and (c) any other department if the ministerial direction relates to national security or intelligence.”
- A coordination duty with the Privacy Commissioner was added.
After: “Coordination with Privacy Commissioner 15.1 (1) When fulfilling its mandate under any of paragraphs 8(1)(a) to (c), the Review Agency may coordinate its activities with those of the Privacy Comm”
How precisely it is written
vagueChallenging the law: EasyDisputing a charge: Hard
The text relies heavily on subjective phrases such as 'considers appropriate' and 'in the opinion of' that leave key decisions open to argument. Defined terms exist for institutions but do not constrain the broad discretion given to officials and the Review Agency.
Open to argument
“any finding or recommendation that it considers appropriate”
This lets the Agency decide the scope of its own reviews without an objective limit.“the Agency deems necessary for the exercise of its powers”
Access to documents turns on the Agency's own view rather than a fixed legal test.“if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary”
Both 'contribute' and 'reasonably necessary' are open-ended standards inviting prolonged debate.“If the Review Agency is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to report on any matter”
Whether a special report is issued depends entirely on the Agency's subjective assessment of public interest.
Discretion. Ministers and the Review Agency retain wide latitude to decide what counts as 'appropriate', 'necessary', 'reasonable' or 'in the public interest' when issuing directions, sharing information, conducting studies or releasing reports.
Challenging the law itself. The repeated use of subjective standards such as 'considers appropriate' and 'public interest' engages the Charter vagueness doctrine under section 7 and could support an overbreadth argument.
Disputing a charge under it. Because compliance often turns on the Agency's or Minister's opinion rather than an objective fact, a person accused of non-compliance would face difficulty proving the decision was wrong.
Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.
Did it work?
partly effective
The National Security Act, 2017 established NSIRA with a broad mandate for integrated review of national security and intelligence activities across government, and NSIRA has operated since 2019 producing reviews, findings, and recommendations that have driven some governance improvements. However, a five-year academic evaluation based on practitioner interviews identifies positive changes alongside significant challenges including access issues, attitudinal conflicts, and eroding trust that risk undermining the system's efficacy.
- Five years of Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Review Agency: early successes, growing pains and unforced errors (Intelligence and National Security, 2026)studyThe new agency has led to positive changes in national security review but is beset by growing pains worsened by attitudinal challenges contributing to a breakdown in trust.
- National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Annual Report 2023reviewNSIRA completed multiple reviews including on CSIS dataset regime (finding compliance issues inconsistent with the statutory framework) and foreign interference intelligence dissemination, demonstrating operationalization of the broad mandate.
- NSIRA Annual Report 2024reviewAfter five years, NSIRA has become a robust review body conducting nine reviews in 2024 and issuing its first special report, complementing other accountability mechanisms.
Who lobbied on it
No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.
Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.