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Bill C-71 · 38th Parliament · Paul Martin

First Nations Commercial and Industrial Development Act

An Act respecting the regulation of commercial and industrial undertakings on reserve lands

Government bill. Became law.

Indigenous rightstrademining and mineralsinternational developmentfederal-provincial relations

  1. IntroducedNov. 2, 2005
  2. Debated in principleNov. 23, 2005
  3. Studied by a committeeDone
  4. Passed its first chamberNov. 23, 2005
  5. Passed the second chamberNov. 24, 2005
  6. Became lawNov. 25, 2005

Leading supporters

Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.

  1. Paul MartinPrime Minister

Who carries this bill

Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.

Where members stand

Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.

How it changed on the way

65% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (1,945 words introduced, 1,889 passed).

substantial changeintent mostly kept

The core regulatory framework for commercial and industrial undertakings on reserve lands remained intact, but Parliament added a new section on limits on liability, defences and immunities plus completed an incomplete sentence on court review. Minor renumbering and the insertion of an 'Amounts received' heading also occurred between introduction and royal assent.

  • The sentence on provincial court review was completed.
    Before: “regulations is subject to review by, or appeal to, the courts of the province in the same manner and to the same extent a”
    After: “as if the provincial law applied of its own force.”

How precisely it is written

45VaguePrecise

mixedChallenging the law: HardDisputing a charge: Moderate

The Act sets clear triggers and defined terms for when regulations can be made but leaves most content and enforcement powers to the Governor in Council with subjective language. This creates a framework that copies provincial rules yet invites argument over what adaptations or powers are needed.

Open to argument

  • “confer any legislative, administrative, judicial or other power on any person or body that the Governor in Council considers necessary to effectively regulate the under”
    Uses a subjective necessity test instead of listing exact powers.
  • “with any adaptations that the Governor in Council considers necessary”
    Allows undefined changes to incorporated provincial laws at the regulator's discretion.
  • “in circumstances and subject to conditions similar to those applicable to the exercise of that power outside reserve lands under laws of the province”
    Relies on a vague similarity standard rather than objective criteria.

Clear-cut

  • “"first nation" means a band as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act”
    Uses an existing statutory definition for clarity.

Discretion. Extensive discretion is left to the Governor in Council to decide the content of regulations, the powers conferred on officials, and any adaptations of provincial laws, plus further discretion to provincial bodies applying those rules.

Challenging the law itself. The Act is enabling legislation whose main effects occur through later regulations, so a facial Charter challenge on vagueness or overbreadth under section 7 or section 35 would be difficult without specific regulations in place.

Disputing a charge under it. Because the regulations largely copy provincial rules, disputes over whether conduct breached the rules would often turn on the same factual and interpretive questions that arise under provincial law, though arguments about adaptations or federal overrides could add complexity.

Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.

Did it work?

partly effective

A departmental evaluation of the Investment in Economic Opportunities program (which includes FNCIDA) found it has potential to generate large revenues for First Nations through investment and jobs, with some early project success demonstrated, though complex projects require significant time for full results. The evaluation concluded FNCIDA remains the best approach to address regulatory gaps on-reserve, with no Auditor General, PBO, statutory reviews, or court rulings identified specifically assessing its overall effectiveness.

  • Evaluation of the Investment in Economic OpportunitiesevaluationFNCIDA has the potential for creating opportunities for economic development projects with early success shown in projects like the Fort William sawmill, but full results take time; it is the best means to address regulatory gaps.

Who lobbied on it

No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.

Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.