Bill C-57 · 38th Parliament · Paul Martin
An Act to amend certain Acts in relation to financial institutions
Government bill. Became law.
- IntroducedJune 6, 2005
- Debated in principleOct. 6, 2005
- Studied by a committeeDone
- Passed its first chamberNov. 23, 2005
- Passed the second chamberNov. 24, 2005
- Became lawNov. 25, 2005
Leading supporters
Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.
- Paul MartinPrime Minister
Who carries this bill
Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.
Where members stand
Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.
How it changed on the way
63% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (88,175 words introduced, 86,046 passed).
substantial changeintent mostly kept
The bill passed with 63% of its introduced text revised or replaced before royal assent. Core definitions and rules on share series, stated capital, and subsidiary share acquisitions were retained with only minor completions and adjustments.
How precisely it is written
mixedChallenging the law: ModerateDisputing a charge: Moderate
The bill mixes concrete numerical thresholds and joint-liability rules with repeated cross-references to undefined regulations and subjective phrases such as 'reasonably calculated' or 'in the opinion of the directors'. This leaves core governance procedures and disclosure duties open to later administrative elaboration rather than settled on the face of the statute.
Open to argument
“as defined in the regulations”
Multiple key terms are left entirely to future regulations, preventing immediate determination of what satisfies the requirement.“in the opinion of the directors necessary to present fairly”
A subjective director judgment replaces an objective accounting test, inviting disputes over adequacy.“might reasonably be expected to materially affect the value”
The 'reasonably expected' and 'materially' standards are open-ended and fact-specific, requiring case-by-case argument.“subject to any terms and conditions that the Superintendent considers appropriate”
Broad discretionary power to attach conditions undermines predictability of the exemption regime.
Clear-cut
“the total number of shareholders whose proxies are solicited is 15 or fewer”
A bright-line numerical threshold removes discretion on when a dissident's circular is required.“all debts not exceeding six months wages”
A fixed temporal and monetary cap on director wage liability is stated without qualification.“within 10 days after the approval”
A specific calendar deadline governs the notice obligation.
Discretion. Extensive regulation-making power is granted to the Governor in Council for electronic meetings and voting, while the Superintendent may exempt institutions from record-keeping rules and attach any conditions deemed appropriate.
Challenging the law itself. Vague phrases such as 'reasonably calculated' and open-ended regulatory definitions could support a vagueness or overbreadth argument under Charter s. 7 or s. 2(b) if applied to expressive proxy solicitations.
Disputing a charge under it. A person accused of insider tipping or improper solicitation can readily dispute whether information 'might reasonably be expected' to affect value or whether conduct was 'reasonably calculated' to obtain proxies, given the subjective wording.
Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.
Did it work?
no evaluation found
Who lobbied on it
No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.
Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.