Bill C-25 · 38th Parliament · Paul Martin
Remote Sensing Space Systems Act
An Act governing the operation of remote sensing space systems
Government bill. Became law.
- IntroducedNov. 23, 2004
- Debated in principleDec. 7, 2004
- Studied by a committeeDone
- Passed its first chamberOct. 5, 2005
- Passed the second chamberNov. 24, 2005
- Became lawNov. 25, 2005
Leading supporters
Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.
- Paul MartinPrime Minister
Who carries this bill
Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.
Where members stand
Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.
How it changed on the way
59% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (7,833 words introduced, 7,766 passed). A committee amended it.
substantial changeintent mostly kept
The bill gained an explicit requirement to protect provincial interests when granting exemptions from the Act and a new mandatory independent review clause. Licensing conditions and definitions stayed almost unchanged except for added text on remote sensing products.
- Added provincial interests as a condition for exemptions by ministerial order.
Before: “(b) adequate provision will be made for the protection of the environment, public health and the safety of persons and property.”
After: “(b) adequate provision will be made for the protection of the environment, public health and the safety of persons and property; and (c) the interests of the provinces are pro”
- Inserted a new independent review and report requirement before royal assent.
After: “REVIEW AND REPORT 45.1 Independent review”
How precisely it is written
vagueChallenging the law: EasyDisputing a charge: Moderate
The Act relies heavily on ministerial opinions and broad phrases such as 'considers appropriate' or 'believes on reasonable grounds' to trigger licensing conditions, suspensions, orders and inspections. Defined terms and fixed dollar or day limits exist but do not offset the wide subjective discretion.
Open to argument
“any other condition that the Minister considers appropriate”
Leaves the content of licence conditions entirely to the Minister's subjective judgment without objective criteria.“any service through the licensed system that the Minister believes on reasonable grounds is desirable”
Ties compulsory service orders to an official's belief about desirability rather than a fixed statutory test.“the public interest in having the information or documents provided outweighs in importance any other interest, including privacy interest”
Requires a balancing of undefined interests that courts must litigate case by case.
Clear-cut
“A licence is valid for the period that the Minister considers appropriate and specifies in it.”
While discretionary, the licence must state a definite period.“tive monetary penalty for a particular violation, which maximum may not exceed $5,000, in the case of an individual, and $25,000, in any other case”
Supplies clear numeric ceilings.“suspend a licence in whole or in part for a period of up to 90 days”
Fixes an objective maximum duration.
Discretion. Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defence and the Solicitor General, plus enforcement officers and inspectors, hold wide power to decide licence terms, suspend operations, compel services, enter premises and set penalties on the basis of their own beliefs or assessments of national security, international relations or public interest.
Challenging the law itself. The repeated use of subjective ministerial satisfaction and undefined concepts such as 'injurious' or 'desirable' engages the Charter doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth, particularly sections 2(b), 7 and 8.
Disputing a charge under it. A person served with a notice of violation can make representations and appeal on the facts or the amount of penalty, but the Act's presumptions and the 'balance of probabilities' standard limit the scope of successful challenges.
Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.
Did it work?
partly effective
Statutory independent reviews (2012, 2017, 2022) mandated by s. 45.1 confirm the RSSSA provides effective tools for national security and foreign policy oversight while meeting international obligations, but increasingly inhibits technological development, commercial growth, and Canadian competitiveness in remote sensing. No Auditor General, PBO, or court evaluations were identified.
- 2022 Independent Review of the Remote Sensing Space Systems Act (RSSSA)reviewThe RSSSA provides an effective regulatory framework for security and foreign policy control but opportunity costs now outweigh benefits, inhibiting technological development and making Canada less competitive.
- 2017 Independent Review of the Remote Sensing Space Systems ActreviewThe Act leans toward protecting national security at the expense of technological development and commercial interests, while upholding international obligations but struggling with technological pace and unclear definitions.
- Review of Remote Sensing Space Systems Regulations – SOR/2007-66reviewMultiple independent reviews (2012, 2017, 2022) identified areas for improvement; neither the Act nor regulations have been amended since 2007 despite recommendations.
- 2012 Independent Review of the Remote Sensing Space Systems ActreviewThe RSSSA addresses important regulatory issues for remote sensing but its impact on technological development could not be fully assessed after only five years, with unclear scope of application.
Who lobbied on it
No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.
Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.