Bill C-20 · 38th Parliament · Paul Martin
First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act
An Act to provide for real property taxation powers of first nations, to create a First Nations Tax Commission, First Nations Financial Management Board, First Nations Finance Authority and First Nations Statistical Institute and to make consequential amendments to other Acts
Government bill. Became law.
- IntroducedNov. 2, 2004
- Debated in principleDec. 10, 2004
- Studied by a committeeDone
- Passed its first chamberDec. 10, 2004
- Passed the second chamberMarch 20, 2005
- Became lawMarch 23, 2005
Leading supporters
Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.
- Paul MartinPrime Minister
Who carries this bill
Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.
Where members stand
Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.
How it changed on the way
59% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (18,625 words introduced, 18,178 passed). A committee amended it.
substantial changeintent mostly kept
The bill kept its core framework for First Nations taxation powers and new institutions but altered key conditions on financial administration laws and added a reference to the Westbank self-government act. Several sections on by-laws, reviews and consequential amendments were removed or reworded during passage.
- Changed the prerequisite for making certain local revenue laws from a simple requirement to make a financial administration law to a prohibition until that law is also approved by the Board.
Before: “Before making any law under subsection 5(1), the council of a first nation shall make a law respecting the financial administration of the first nation under paragraph 9(1)(a).”
After: “The council of a first nation may not make a law under paragraph 5(1)(d) until the council has made a law respecting the financial admin- istration of the first nation under paragraph 9(1)(a) and that law has been approved by the First Nations Financial Management Board.”
- Added a new consequential amendment reference to the Westbank First Nation Self-Government Act.
After: “Westbank First Nation Self-Government Act”
- Added explicit limits on deleting a band from the schedule if amounts remain owing to the Finance Authority.
Before: “(3) At the request of the council of a band, the Governor in Council may, by order, amend the schedule by adding, deleting or changing the name of the band.”
After: “(3) At the request of the council of a band, the Governor in Council may, by order, amend the schedule in order to Amendments to schedule (a) add or change the name of the band; or (b) delete the name of the band, as long as there are no amounts owing by the band to the First Nations Finance Authority that remain unpaid.”
How precisely it is written
mixedChallenging the law: ModerateDisputing a charge: Moderate
The Act supplies many defined terms and concrete numerical limits that fix obligations clearly, yet repeatedly conditions powers on subjective opinions of boards or councils. This mix creates pockets of black-and-white rules alongside open-ended discretion.
Open to argument
“if, in the opinion of the Board, there is a serious risk that the first nation will default”
The phrase turns enforcement on an undefined internal judgment rather than an objective test.“who, in the opinion of the council, may be affected by the proposed law”
Notice obligations hinge on the council's subjective view of affected parties.“any rules that it considers necessary for the conduct of”
Rule-making power is bounded only by the body's own assessment of necessity.“recommend any intervention under section 52 or 53 that it considers appropriate”
The choice and form of intervention rest on an undefined appropriateness standard.
Clear-cut
“A borrowing member shall not repeal a property taxation law.”
A flat prohibition leaves no interpretive room.“liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both”
Maximum penalties are stated in exact dollar and time figures.“"long-term loan" means a loan the term of which is one year or longer.”
The definition supplies a bright-line temporal threshold.
Discretion. Extensive discretion is granted to the Commission, Board and Authority through repeated “in the opinion of” clauses and powers to decide what rules or interventions are necessary or appropriate, with only limited regulation-making constraints.
Challenging the law itself. Vague opinion-based triggers could support a vagueness or overbreadth argument under s. 7 of the Charter, though the many defined terms and specific prohibitions narrow the target.
Disputing a charge under it. An accused could readily dispute whether an opinion-based precondition such as “serious risk” was actually met, but clear statutory bans and numerical limits would be harder to contest.
Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.
Did it work?
partly effective
The 2011 departmental evaluation and 2012 parliamentary legislative review found the Act addressed needs for taxation and financing tools, with FNTC, FMB, and FNFA delivering mandated services and generating community-level impacts like local revenues and certifications, while the First Nations Statistical Institute showed insufficient progress. Later amendments, active institutions, and financing milestones indicate ongoing partial success, though a peer-reviewed analysis notes persistent federal oversight limiting full self-government objectives.
- Evaluation of the Implementation of the First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act (AANDC, 2011)evaluationFNTC, FMB, and FNFA were delivering services with early community impacts; FNSI had insufficient evidence of measurable progress toward outcomes.
- A Report to Parliament on the Legislative Review of the First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act (March 2012)reviewThe Act provides choice for capacity and financing tools; institutions showed progress except FNSI, which faced operational delays pending audits.
- Policy Forum: A Critical Analysis of Property Taxation Under the First Nations Fiscal Management Act as a Self-Government Tool (Audrey Boissonneault, SSRN, 2021)studyThe legislation delegates taxation powers but federal regulations and FNTC composition maintain significant control, limiting meaningful self-government.
- Impact Evaluation of Governance and Institutions of Government (CIRNAC)evaluationFNTC supported $44M in revenues, FMB certified 61 First Nations, and FNFA enabled over $85M in financing, described internally as a considerable success.
Who lobbied on it
No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.
Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.