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Bill C-3 · 37th Parliament · Jean Chrétien

An Act to amend the Eldorado Nuclear Limited Reorganization and Divestiture Act and the Petro-Canada Public Participation Act

Government bill. Became law.

energymining and minerals

  1. IntroducedFeb. 2, 2001
  2. Debated in principleFeb. 16, 2001
  3. Studied by a committeeDone
  4. Passed its first chamberMay 1, 2001
  5. Passed the second chamberJune 11, 2001
  6. Became lawJune 13, 2001

Leading supporters

Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.

  1. Jean ChrétienPrime Minister

Who carries this bill

Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.

Where members stand

Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.

How it changed on the way

76% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (1,192 words introduced, 564 passed).

substantial changeintent mostly kept

The bill retained the 15% individual and 25% aggregate non-resident limits for Cameco but relaxed Petro-Canada rules. Individual ownership cap rose to 20% and all aggregate non-resident voting limits were dropped.

  • Raised Petro-Canada individual ownership limit from 10% to 20%.
    Before: “more than ten per cent of the votes that may ordinarily be cast to elect directors of Petro-Canada, other than votes that may be so cast by or on behalf of the Minister;”
  • Eliminated aggregate non-resident ownership cap for Petro-Canada.
    Before: “more than twenty-five per cent of the votes that may ordinarily be cast to elect directors of Petro-Canada, other than votes that may be so cast by or on behalf of the Minister;”

How precisely it is written

78VaguePrecise

mostly preciseChallenging the law: HardDisputing a charge: Moderate

The bill sets fixed percentage caps on share ownership and uses detailed language to describe prohibited holdings and asset sales. A few phrases like 'substantially all' leave limited room for argument over exact application.

Open to argument

  • “all or substantially all of its assets”
    The term 'substantially all' requires case-by-case judgment rather than a fixed numerical test.

Clear-cut

  • “more than fifteen per cent of the votes that may ordinarily be cast to elect directors”
    Uses a clear numerical threshold and objective voting test.
  • “more than twenty per cent of the votes that may ordinarily be cast to elect directors of Petro-Canada”
    Provides an exact percentage limit with no subjective qualifiers.
  • “otherwise than by way of security only, in the aggregate voting shares to which are attached more than twenty per cent”
    Specifies exact scope and exceptions in objective terms.

Discretion. No discretionary power is granted to ministers or officials; the amendments dictate mandatory content for corporate articles.

Challenging the law itself. The provisions use specific numerical limits and defined constraints, making a successful vagueness or overbreadth challenge under section 7 of the Charter unlikely.

Disputing a charge under it. A person could dispute whether a transaction meets the 'all or substantially all' threshold, though the ownership percentages themselves are straightforward to apply.

Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.

Did it work?

no evaluation found

    Who lobbied on it

    No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.

    Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.