Bill C-18 · 37th Parliament · Jean Chrétien
An Act to amend the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act
Government bill. Became law.
- IntroducedMarch 15, 2001
- Debated in principleApril 2, 2001
- Studied by a committeeDone
- Passed its first chamberMay 8, 2001
- Passed the second chamberJune 11, 2001
- Became lawJune 13, 2001
Leading supporters
Ranked by the part each played: who is responsible for the bill, who carried it, and who spoke for it most.
- Jean ChrétienPrime Minister
Who carries this bill
Arrows run from the person responsible to those who answer to them on this bill. The critic leads the Senate’s scrutiny and answers to no one on it.
Where members stand
Votes and debate for this bill have not been read yet.
How it changed on the way
92% of the text as introduced was changed or removed by the time it became law (439 words introduced, 292 passed).
transformative changeintent broadened
The cap on total equalization payments was extended to cover the 1999 fiscal year in addition to later years. The 1999 amount was fixed at ten billion dollars while later years continued to use the GDP adjustment from the 1999 base.
How precisely it is written
mostly preciseChallenging the law: HardDisputing a charge: Hard
The text sets a hard cap on total equalization payments using a fixed ten-billion-dollar base adjusted by a specific GDP percentage change calculated by the Chief Statistician. It relies on exact calendar years and fiscal years beginning April 1 2000, leaving only the calculation method to prescription.
Open to argument
“as determined by the Chief Statistician of Canada in the pre”
The method of calculating the GDP percentage change is left undefined in the statute itself.
Clear-cut
“the amount of ten billion dollars”
Uses a fixed numerical starting point rather than a discretionary or subjective standard.“from the calendar year ending on December 31, 1999 to the calendar year ending in the fiscal year”
Specifies exact start and end periods with no room for interpretation.“the fiscal year that begins on April 1, 2000”
Anchors the rule to a concrete date rather than a flexible or opinion-based trigger.
Discretion. The Chief Statistician or regulations determine the exact manner of GDP measurement, but this affects only the arithmetic and does not grant broader policy discretion over payment amounts.
Challenging the law itself. The provision concerns intergovernmental fiscal transfers and contains no vague prohibitions that would readily engage section 7 liberty or section 2 expression interests under the Charter.
Disputing a charge under it. Any dispute would turn on verifiable GDP statistics and arithmetic reduction rather than subjective judgments about conduct or harm.
Read by a language model from the royal assent text; every quoted phrase appears in the bill. A reading of the drafting, not legal advice.
Did it work?
no evaluation found
Who lobbied on it
No lobbying registration naming this bill is loaded.
Stages and dates from LEGISinfo.